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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Whether the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond
initial seizure?

II.

If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the Fourth Amendment
protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial seizure
should that protection extend?
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010. (R. at 16). Petitioner filed his
petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010. (R. at 17). This Court granted the petition on
October 7, 2010. (R. at 18). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (2000). A
district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed
for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are the
relevant provisions and are reproduced in the addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 23, 2008, John Marlin (“Marlin”), a police officer employed by
Respondent Fair County Police Department, pulled Beau Radley (“Radley”) over on the
suspicion that Radley was driving drunk. (R. at 3). Marlin took Radley into custody and
transported Radley to the Fair Police Station after Radley refused to take a breathalyzer test. (R.
at 3). Upon arriving at the police station, Marlin escorted Radley into the booking room and
handed Radley off to Respondent Officer Arthur Goode (“Goode”). (R. at 3). Marlin exited the
booking room leaving Radley in the sole custody of Goode. (R. at 3). Goode removed Radley’s
handcuffs for the booking process and re-cuffed Radley upon completion; however, Radley
complained that the handcuffs were too tight. (R. at 3). When Marlin returned, Radley
complained again, and Marlin loosened the handcuffs. (R. at 3). Goode then escorted Radley,
without Marlin, to a holding cell where Radley alleges Goode pushed and hit Radley (R. at 3).
Hours later Radley was examined at the Fair County Hospital. (R. at 3). Radley’s wrists were
bruised and he had a cut lip and bruising along his jaw. (R. at 4).
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Radley filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Fair against Respondents for deprivation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (R. at 2) alleging
violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Respondents’ use of excessive
force. (R. at 4). The District Court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss the Fourth
Amendment component of Radley’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. (R. at 11). The Fifteenth Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the
District Court. (R. at 16). Radley’s petition for writ of certiorari to this Court was granted on
October 7, 2010. (R. at 18). Respondents respectfully request this Court uphold the decision of
the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals and dismiss Radley’s claim.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I
The Fifteenth Circuit did not err in affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the Fourth
Amendment component of Radley’s excessive use of force claim. The Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable seizures. However, Fourth Amendment protection does not extend
past initial seizure because seizure is “a single act” and not “a continuous fact.” Nevertheless,
some courts subscribe to the idea of continuing seizure but do not agree as to where seizure ends
and pretrial detention begins. Although Graham provides support for the idea of continuing
seizure, the facts in Graham are not sufficiently analogous to the case at bar to control the
outcome. The concept of continuing seizure is illogical and is at best a legal fiction. A
distinction should be made between the act of seizure and the state of seizure. The Fourth
Amendment is directed at the act of seizure and not at the conditions of seizure. The moment
Radley was seized, he became a pretrial detainee. As a pretrial detainee, Radley’s excessive use
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of force claim falls under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Fourth
Amendment.
II
In the event that this Court favors continuing seizure over initial seizure, Fourth
Amendment protection should cease once the detainee is no longer in the custody of the arresting
officer or officers. The arresting officer rule finds support in the jurisprudence of this Court and
is not inconsistent with Graham. Furthermore, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits explicitly
espouse and follow the arresting officer rule. Finally, the arresting officer rule would provide
much needed consistency, is easy to follow, and makes sense. Radley’s claim does not survive
under the arresting officer rule and should be dismissed.
I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE FORCE DOES
NOT EXTEND BEYOND INITIAL SEIZURE.
A. The interpretation of the concept of seizure and the application of Fourth
Amendment protection to excessive force claims after Graham has not been
consistent.
Analysis of excessive force claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begin by identifying

the allegedly infringed constitutional right. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
Hence, when a plaintiff files an excessive force claim, a court must first determine whether the
plaintiff’s claim is governed by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment. See Riley
v. Dorton, 115 F. 3d 1159, 1161 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Amendment protects free citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. Excessive force
claims that arise in the context of an investigatory stop or arrest of a free citizen must be
analyzed within the contours of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 394 (discussing Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)) (making explicit the implicit analysis in Garner that all claims of
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excessive force by law enforcement officers’ “seizure” be analyzed under the “reasonableness”
standard of the Fourth Amendment).
According to Graham, seizure by government actors which restrains the liberty of a free
citizen through a showing of authority or physical force triggers Fourth Amendment protections.
Id. at 395 n.10 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968)). However, Graham did not resolve
whether Fourth Amendment protection against deliberate excessive physical force continues to
apply beyond the ending point of arrest and the beginning of pretrial detention. Id. Graham also
did not specify at what point arrest ends and pretrial detention begins. Id. (The Court referred to
the ending point of arrest but did not actually define it when declining to answer whether the
Fourth Amendment continues to apply after arrest). Graham’s open-endedness has led to a split
amongst the circuit courts with regard to the application of the Fourth Amendment to excessive
use of force claims by individuals who have been seized. See generally Riley, 115 F.3d 1159
(providing an overview of the split with reference to specific circuits).
A critical and much disputed issue amongst the circuit courts is whether the Fourth
Amendment continues to apply after initial seizure. See generally, id. Initial seizure is the idea
that seizure is limited to the initial act of seizing. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163 (citing Wilkins v. May,
872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989)). Courts holding that the Fourth Amendment applies after initial
seizure espouse the idea of continuing seizure. Id. at 1162. Continuing seizure is the idea that
seizure does not end at the point of arrest but continues while the person is in custody. Id.
Respondents hold, with Riley, that the concept of continuing seizure is out-of-place given this
Court’s definition of seizure. See id. at 1163. (Seizure is “a single act”) (quoting Thompson v.
Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873)).
B. This Court’s definition of seizure does not support the idea of continuing seizure.

4

In Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470, this Court defined seizure as “a single act” explicitly stating
seizure is “not a continuous fact.” Thompson is about seizure of property; however, the simple
language of the Fourth Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and property. Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). According to this Court, a Fourth Amendment seizure
occurs when the government intentionally terminates an individual’s freedom of movement.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593
(1989)). Hence, it follows that once a law enforcement officer has seized a person by
intentionally terminating that person’s freedom of movement, the single act of detention has been
effectuated and seizure has been completed. See Robles v. Prince George’s County, Md., 302
F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Riley, 115 F.3d). A person who has been detained through
intentional termination of movement remains seized but the act of seizure has ended since
seizure itself is not a “continuous fact.” See Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470 (1873). It is the
possession following the seizure and not the seizure that is continuous. Id. at 470. Thus, once
Radley was handcuffed by Marlin (R. at 3), Radley’s seizure came to an end although Radley
was in fact seized since Radley was in the custody or possession of Marlin.
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to Radley’s excessive use of force claim because
Radley became a pretrial detainee once his seizure was effectuated. See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163
(citing Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1994)) (holding that an individual that has
been arrested and placed in police custody becomes a pretrial detainee protected by the Due
Process Clause). This Court has held that the Due Process Clause provides pretrial detainees
with protection from use of force that is excessive amounting to punishment. Graham, 490 U.S.
at 395 n.10. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
C. While Graham implies that the concept of continuing seizure is valid, Graham’s
facts are not sufficiently analogous to the case at bar for Graham to control.
5

Despite this Court’s definition of seizure in Thompson, this Court’s holding in Graham,
suggests that initial seizure extends beyond the act of seizure. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
(holding that all excessive force claims against law enforcement officers during the course of a
seizure of a citizen who is free such as an arrest or investigatory stop be analyzed under the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment and not the substantive due process
approach). Dethorne Graham (“Graham”) had already been effectively seized when the alleged
excessive use of force occurred because his freedom of movement had intentionally been
terminated when one of the arriving officers placed Graham in handcuffs. Id. at 389. However,
Graham, unlike Radley, was detained briefly during an investigatory stop that did not result in
arrest and much less in pretrial detention. Id. at 389. Graham was not arrested but only detained
while the officer who stopped him ascertained whether or not his suspicions were valid. Id.
Radley, on the other hand, was arrested and transported to the police station where he was
booked and jailed. (R. at 3). Graham’s seizure occurred in pre-arrest mode and as such
Graham’s seizure does not fall within the much disputed “legal twilight zone,” a term coined by
the Fifth Circuit court referring to the point between arrest and sentencing. Wilson v. Spain, 209
F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000).
D. The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts have ascertained in rejecting the
idea of continuing seizure and have properly refused to apply Fourth
Amendment protection past initial seizure.
The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts espouse initial seizure while the Second,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts do not. See generally, Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163-64. The courts
that reject the concept of initial seizure agree that seizure extends beyond initial seizure but do
not agree where it ends. See Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (5th Cir.1993). The
Fifth Circuit, for example, explained that the Fourth Amendment text prohibiting unreasonable
6

seizures does not lend support to its application in a post-arrest encounter. Id. at 1163 (citing
Brothers, 28 F.3d 452). The Seventh Circuit had previously endorsed this position. Id. (citing
Wilkins, 872 F.2d 190).
The courts that reject the idea of “continuing seizure” are correct. See generally, Riley,
115 F.3d. 1159. First, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court has defined seizure as “a single
act” instead of “a continuous fact.” Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470. Second, as the Fourth Circuit
pointed out, a review of the basic jurisprudence of the Supreme Court reveals decades of
precedent pertaining to the Fourth Amendment focusing on initial deprivation of liberty. Riley,
115 F.3d at 1162 (citing seventeen sources spanning the 1950’s to the 1990’s). It follows then
that the Fourth Amendment is not directed at the conditions of custody but rather at the act of
arrest. See id. at 1163. Third, one should look at the plain meaning of the word “seizure” itself to
see that the idea of “continuing seizure” is flawed and is at best a legal fiction. See Wilkins, 872
F.2d at 192-193. A legal fiction is an assumption that though something may be untrue, it is true
for the purpose of altering the operation of a legal rule within the process of judicial reasoning.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). However, fictio juris non est ubi veritas. Respondents
implore this Court rule accordingly.
A natural interpretation would limit the word “seizure” to the act of initial seizing
meaning that subsequent events happened after and not during the seizure. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at
192-93. Consequently, any excessive use of force events occurring after initial seizure would be
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment because these events would not have occurred
within the act of seizing. Id. Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment does not
provide an appropriate constitutional basis after completion of the incidents of arrest; after
release of the plaintiff from the custody of the arresting officer; and, after the plaintiff had been
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awaiting trial in detention for a period of time which is significant. Valencia, 981 F.2d at 144344.
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the Fourth Amendment is inapt after arrest since the
scope of its inquiry is the reasonableness of the force used in seizing and restraining a suspect in
relation to the danger the suspect poses to the officer handling the arrest and to the surrounding
community. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193-94. The Wilkins Court concluded that once the officer has
custody over the suspect, the issue is moot. Id. The Fourth Circuit would agree. See Orem v.
Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 2008) (refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment in a
situation where the officer used a taser on an unruly suspect while she was in the back seat of the
squad car). The Orem Court held that since the suspect had been arrested when the officer used
his taser, the act of seizure was complete. Id. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Orem is consistent
with the Fourth Circuit’s previous holding in Robles. In Robles, police officers tied a suspect to
a metal pole after his arrest after the county that had issued his warrant refused to retrieve him
from the arresting officers. See Robles, 302 F.3d at 267. The Robles Court held that since the
arrest had been completed when the incident took place, and since the arrest complied with the
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment did not extend because the suspect
was then a pretrial detainee. Id. at 269.
The Fifth Circuit has given the following reasons for not adopting the idea of continuing
seizure and thus not applying the Fourth Amendment to pretrial detainees’ excessive force
claims. The Fourth Amendment’s lack of textual support to the post-arrest encounter; the
Supreme Court’s refusal to apply Fourth Amendment protection to inmates after incarceration;
and, the holding in Graham and Bell that the appropriate constitutional basis is the Due Process
Clause with regard to excessive force suits by pretrial detainees. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163 (citing
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Brothers, 28 F.3d 452) (holding that an individual that has been arrested and placed in police
custody becomes a pretrial detainee protected by the Due Process Clause).
Justice Ginsburg has argued that application of the Fourth Amendment is justified under
“continuing seizure” contending that a person’s seizure ends not after arrest but continues to the
end of trial. Riley, 115 F.3d 1159 at 1162 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266
(1994)(Ginsburg, J., concurring)). However, Justice Ginsburg’s argument is contrary to Supreme
Court precedent. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. 520) (holding that pretrial detainees’ excessive force
claims should be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
Radley became a pretrial detainee when his seizure ended the moment he was lawfully
arrested by Marlin. See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1161-62 (quoting e.g., United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d
784 (4th Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1987)) (holding that a person who
has been arrested lawfully and is being held before guilt is formally adjudicated is a pretrial
detainee). In light of the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts’ reasoning, Respondents
maintain that Radley should be classified as a pretrial detainee. As such, Fourth Amendment
protection does not apply, and Radley’s claim should be dismissed.
E. The concept of continuing seizure cannot be logically sustained.
While legal precedent has not clearly established whether seizure ends with the act of
seizing or whether seizure continues after the act of seizing, it is inherent in the meaning of the
word seizure itself to interpret it to mean initial seizure. See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192-93. There
can be no such thing as continuous seizure in terms of action because the act of seizure ends once
the individual has been seized. See Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470. The fact that a person is seized
does not mean that he or she is in the act of being seized. See id. at 470 (distinguishing between
seizure and possession following seizure). One should distinguish between the act of seizure and
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the state of seizure. See id. To exemplify the distinction between the act of seizure and the state
of seizure, consider the case of a person who has been convicted and is serving the tenth year of
a lengthy prison sentence. This person has long since been seized and is in a state of seizure, yet
this Court has held that the Eighth Amendment governs a claim of excessive use of force and not
the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312
(1986)). In plain terms, once the seizure of a free person has happened, the act of seizure is over
and the Fourth Amendment no longer applies. See id.
Respondents do not dispute that Radley was seized. However, Respondents respectfully
point out that it is not enough that Radley was in a state of seizure when the alleged use of
excessive force occurred for the Fourth Amendment to apply. By the time that Goode allegedly
injured Radley, the act of seizure had already been completed because Radley had already been
seized by Marlin. (R. at 3).
II.

IF THE COURT WERE TO APPLY A RULE OF CONTINUING SEIZURE TO
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST THE USE OF EXCESSIVE
FORCE, FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION SHOULD CEASE AS SOON
AS THE DETAINEE OR ARRESTEE IS NO LONGER UNDER THE CUSTODY
OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER OR OFFICERS.
A. The arresting officer rule finds support in this Court’s jurisprudence and is not
inconsistent with Graham.
That Graham provides support for the idea of continuing seizure cannot be denied.

However, Fourth Amendment protection against use of excessive force should not apply once the
detainee is no longer in the custody of the arresting officer or officers. Valencia, 981 F.2d at
1444. The arresting officer rule, as described in the preceding sentence, is not inconsistent with
Graham based on the facts of the case. In Graham, the use of excessive force occurred while
Graham was still in custody of the officer that seized him. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389. A textual
reading of the case reveals that Graham was handcuffed tightly by the officer that seized him
10

implying that excessive force was used both in the course of seizing Graham and after Graham
was seized when Graham’s face was shoved against the hood of the car. Id. Only a short
amount of time had elapsed between applying the handcuffs to shoving Graham against the car
hood. Id. Graham was in the same location under the dominion of the same officers including
the officer that handcuffed him when he was injured. Id. In contrast, more time had elapsed
since Radley had been seized. In addition, Radley was no longer at the location where he had
been seized or under the dominion of the officer who had seized him when the alleged excessive
use of force occurred against Radley. (R. at 3). Again, at the risk of appearing redundant but for
the sake of emphasis, Graham had not been transferred into the custody of another officer during
the excessive use of force incident. Id. Radley, on the other hand, was no longer in the custody
of the officer that arrested him when the alleged use of force occurred. (R. at 3). In Fontana v.
Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s
excessive use of force claim should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment because the
plaintiff was in the custody and “continuing dominion” of the arresting officer. Since Radley
was not in the custody and continuing dominion of the arresting officer when his right to be free
from excessive force was allegedly violated, the Fourth Amendment is not the appropriate
constitutional standard by which to analyze Radley’s claim.
Graham reaffirms in its dicta Garner’s holding that that both when a particular seizure is
made and how it is carried out determine the “reasonableness” of a particular seizure. Id. at 395
(citing Garner, 471 U.S. 1). The Graham Court goes on to say that under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the right to arrest comes with the right to use physical coercion to some degree.
Id. at 396 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1). Furthermore, Graham recognized that some allowance
must be made when calculating reasonableness for the fact police officers have to often make
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split-second judgments. Id. at 396-97. An obvious implication of the analysis provided by the
Graham Court is that a Fourth Amendment seizure often begins with a law enforcement officer’s
decision to initiate the seizure. It is also the officer who effectuates the seizure that determines
how much physical coercion to apply. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. The arresting officer
controls the initial seizure and the immediate conditions of that seizure. See Fontana, 262 F.3d
at 880-81. Once the arresting officer hands the arrestee over to another officer, the conditions of
the arrestee’s seizure are no longer controlled by the arresting officer. See id. It makes sense to
extend Fourth Amendment protection from the point that a law enforcement officer or officers
takes a person into custody through the time the person remains in that officer’s or officers’
custody in light of the officer’s or officers’ continuing dominion over the person that has just
been taken into custody. Marlin’s continuing dominion over Radley ceased when Marlin left
Radley with Goode. (R. at 3).
Furthermore, this Court has suggested in its dicta that after police officers effectuate a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment may apply while the suspect is
under the control of the police officers. Kathryn R. Urbonya, “Accidental" Shootings As Fourth
Amendment Seizures, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 337, 374 (1992) (citing California v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)). This Court briefly touched on the idea of a continuing arrest when this
Court explained that if a suspect escaped after an officer stopped the suspect through the use of
physical force, there may have been an arrest but not a continuing arrest. Id. In other words, the
Court recognized there would have been a continuing seizure while the suspect remained with
the arresting officer. Id.
B. Some Circuits explicitly follow the arresting officer rule.
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The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly based their decision to apply the
Fourth Amendment based on the arrestee being in the custody of the arresting officer when the
alleged excessive force occurred. E.g., Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2002);
Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004
(9th Cir. 1985)); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989). The fact that the
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits subscribe to the arresting officer rule and explicitly state that
they do provides support for this Court’s affirmation of that rule.
C. The arresting officer rule not only makes sense but provides an easy to follow
bright line rule.
Clearly, the lower courts have not been ruling consistently with regard to excessive use of
force claims. Even the courts that agree with the idea of continuing seizure have come to
different conclusions with regard to the point at where seizure ends. See Valencia 981 F.2d
at1444-45. Disagreement amongst the lower courts has led to disparate holdings despite
analogous circumstances even within the same circuits. Mitchell W. Karsh, Excessive Force and
the Fourth Amendment: When Does Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823., 823-24 (1990).
Easy to follow bright line rules that mark the boundary between seizure and detention are needed
for the sake of consistency and fairness. Id. at 827-29.
The arresting officer rule provides a clear and easy to follow bright line rule which would
promote consistency amongst the courts when deciding cases involving excessive use of force
claims against law enforcement officers. The application of the arresting officer rule makes
sense because as the Sixth Circuit put it, the “murky area” of whether the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment applies does not begin while the arrestee is still in the custody of the arresting
officers. See Phelps, 286 F.3d 295 at 300. If the excessive use of force occurs while the arrestee
is still in the custody of the arresting officer or officers, the Fourth Amendment would apply. Id.
13

Conversely, if the excessive use of force occurs after the arrestee is no longer in the custody of
the arresting officer or officers, then the Fourth Amendment would not apply. Id. at 301 (citing
Valencia, 981 F.2d 1440). Consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Phelps, Respondents
hold that because Radley was no longer in the custody of his arresting officer when he sustained
injuries resulting from alleged use of excessive force (R. at 3), Radley had already crossed over
into the “murky area”, and as a result, his claim should be analyzed against the standards of the
Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Fourth Amendment.
While it may be argued that the arresting officer rule is not equitable because some
arrestees will enjoy protection for a greater period of time than others, the simplicity of the rule’s
comprehensibility and application is appealing. A simple rule is preferred over a complex rule
since the bright line needed is one that “irradiates” and not “bedazzles.” Karsch, supra, at 829
(citing Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright
Lines” and “Good Faith”, 43 U. PITT L. REV., 307, 327 (1982). It is impossible to ensure that
every arrestee be held in the custody of the arresting officer or officers for the same length of
time. Indeed, it would be preposterous to be held to such a high and inefficient standard in the
face of impossibility! How long the arrestee remains in the custody of the arresting officer or
officers will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. Once an arrestee is no longer in
the custody of the arresting officer or officers, initial seizure would unequivocally be over, and
Fourth Amendment protection would no longer apply.
CONCLUSION
Radley’s excessive use of force claim should not be analyzed under the reasonableness
standard of the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment does not apply past initial
seizure. The Fourth Amendment is directed towards the act of seizure and not the state of
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seizure. Radley had already been seized when the alleged excessive use of force incident
occurred. Once Radley was seized, Radley became a pretrial detainee and the Fourth
Amendment was no longer applicable. In the alternative, under the concept of continuing
seizure, Radley’s claim also fails under the arresting officer rule. The arresting officer rule
should be applied because it makes sense given that the arresting officer or officers carry out the
arrest and exert continuing dominion over the arrestee or detainee until the arrestee or detainee is
left in the custody of another officer. Furthermore, the arresting officer rule provides a clear
boundary as to where seizure ends and pretrial detention begins.
PRAYER
For these reasons, Respondents pray the Court affirm the decision of the Fifteenth Circuit
and dismiss Radley’s claim.
Respectfully submitted, this 11th day of March, 2011.
_____________________________________________

Maria I. Flores
Counsel for Respondents
One Camino Santa Maria
San Antonio, Texas 78228
Telephone: 210.473.0411
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APPENDIX

FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

42 U.S.C. § 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act of omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.

For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
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